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Introduction
Elihu Root was flustered. President William McKinley was in a heated fight for
reelection. Williams Jennings Bryan, the Democratic challenger, had declared that he would run
against the McKinley administration’s preferred foreign policy of imperialism. Yet Root was not
enamored with the premise that the McKinley administration, and he especially in his role as
Secretary of War, had commissioned such a foreign policy in the diplomatic aftermath of the
Spanish-American War.
It was in this spirit that Root delivered a campaign address on October 24, 1900. Before a
Canton, Ohio audience, he excoriated the anti-imperialists. Bryan and his associates, Root
claimed, had “invented a new issue which they call ‘imperialism’...the cheapest and most
threadbare of the demagogue’s stock, always certain to produce a sensation among a people alert
for the protection of their liberties.”1 Like Jefferson, Lincoln, and Grant, “all three...great and
liberty-loving men,”2 McKinley had been accused of attempting to strangle liberty with military
force and jeopardize the genuine character of America’s republican institutions with an Old
World imperial policy. Root challenged the demagogic voices of the Democratic Party by posing
a simple question: “What has President McKinley done?”3
For Root, the evidence read plain as day. First, American soldiers in Cuba, Puerto Rico,
and the Philippines were succeeding in building nations that had bowed beneath the weight of
imperial oppression. The U.S. had performed a great humanitarian mission:
Our soldiers...have been administering the civil law with justice and moderation. They
have been feeding the hungry and clothing the naked and protecting the weak and

1

Elihu Root, “The United States and the Philippines in 1900: Address at Canton, Ohio, October 24, 1900,” in The
Military and Colonial Policy of the United States: Addresses and Reports, ed. Robert Bacon and James Brown Scott
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1916), 34.
2
Root, The Military and Colonial Policy of the United States, 35.
3
Ibid.
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cleaning the foul cities and establishing hospitals and organizing and opening schools and
building roads and encouraging commerce.4
Beyond this humanitarian service, Root outlined a second and more prominent feature of the
administration’s diplomacy. Root defined imperialism as the willed suppression of a people,
“capable and willing to maintain just government, to make free, intelligent, and efficacious
decisions as to who shall govern.”5 In the secretary’s eyes, circumstances had not bestowed such
a capacity within the Spanish islands. Internal dysfunction and external strategic concerns had
rendered national self-determination a non-viable option. Even Cuba, which bore the criteria for
independence, could not stand without leaning on the shoulder of an American protector. Here,
before the people of Canton, Root rejected Bryan’s imperialist allegation and pronounced in its
place the doctrine of ordered liberty:
When I consider the myriads of human beings who have lived in subjection to the rule of
force, ignorant of any other lot, knowing life only as the beast of the field knows it...I
cannot believe that, for the external forces of civilization to replace the brutal and
oppressive government...by ordered liberty and individual freedom and a rule that shall
start and lead them along the path of political and social progress, is a violation of the
principle of Jefferson, or false to the highest dictates of liberty and humanity.6
For Root, “ordered liberty” was not a new concept, but instead characteristic of the
government that had prevailed since the earliest days of America’s westward expansion. The
secretary appealed to Thomas Jefferson’s authoritative direction of Louisiana, which that
president had deemed incapable of self-government. Continuing in that line, Root asserted, was
Abraham Lincoln, who had deemed it necessary to subdue a Southern desire for national selfdetermination in order to preserve a consistent spirit of law and liberty throughout a united
American nation. A similar policy of ordered liberty later brought America to expand beyond its
coasts and train Hawaii and Alaska for republican statehood. Indeed, Root considered all of

4

Root, The Military and Colonial Policy of the United States, 59.
Root, The Military and Colonial Policy of the United States, 42.
6
Root, The Military and Colonial Policy of the United States, 43.
5
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American federalism a grand project in ordered liberty, with autonomous self-government
granted to individual states and the final ordered authority and capacity to intervene preserved
within the federal government.
Root’s doctrine was unique, however, in that ordered liberty would now be undertaken as
a diplomatic project for foreign entities that lay definitively outside the mandate of American
statehood. The United States would serve as the democratic sponsor of self-governing nations
and not an imperial master of subject nations. With McKinley’s reelection, Root’s diplomatic
incarnation of ordered liberty had been vindicated.

Elihu Root’s August 1, 1899 appointment as Secretary of War culminated an eventful
year. Following America’s triumph in the Spanish-American War and Congressional approval of
the April 11, 1899 Treaty of Paris, the United States had risen to indisputable great power status.
Yet in the spring of 1899, America appeared a naïve giant on the international stage. The U.S.
had premised its war with Spain on the basis of Cuban appeals for humanitarian assistance and
national independence. Fighting concluded in 1898 with a sympathetic U.S. military holding
together the seams of that island, an abrasive military government directing the affairs of “Porto
Rico,” and an American flag planted in a newly annexed Philippines. Although President
McKinley marshaled public opinion behind him through a speaking tour that summer, he spoke
only superficially of America’s intentions for the islands. Meanwhile, a fierce battle raged in
Congress between expansionists and a growing contingent of anti-imperialists. This unresolved
diplomacy landed on Root’s desk in August 1899 and was joined by the further challenge of
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modernizing an outmoded military ill-equipped for providing the legal and humanitarian
assistance critical to self-government.7
Root was also tasked with crafting a policy that accounted for the vastly discrepant
political, economic, and strategic conditions among the three key islands. Cuba had a
longstanding history of democratic insurgency. The Cuban Junta had assiduously exposed
General Valeriano Weyler and his devastating reconcentration of agricultural lands before the
American Congress. There appeared a stable Cuban nationalism soon capable of achieving selfgovernment. Puerto Rico, although a Spanish colony, lacked the spirit of “Cuba Libre.” Puerto
Ricans were mostly satisfied with the autonomy conferred from Spain’s 1897 Autonomous
Charter, and embraced the protections afforded by external American order, so long as they
maintained majority control of their insular affairs. American intervention became all the more
necessary following a hurricane that struck the island in August 1899, a humanitarian disaster on
par with Weyler’s reconcentration. The Philippines, like Cuba, possessed an insurgent movement
demanding freedom from Spanish tyranny. Yet American military officers and McKinley’s
diplomats did not trust its leader, Emilio Aguinaldo. It was uniformly believed that Aguinaldo’s
regime would devolve into military dictatorship. At a deeper level, countless tribes, tongues, and
ethnicities spanned the islands, lacking a national unity that would prove critical to selfgovernment. Beyond these internal tensions, the U.S. feared that simply abandoning the
Philippines would concede all economic and strategic leverage to France, Germany, or some
other great power waiting to pounce.
Out of this crucible of the Spanish-American War, with no coherent foreign policy
binding America’s presence in foreign lands and with manifold voices claiming to represent the
7

For a good summary of Secretary Russell A. Alger’s disorganization at the War Department, see Warren
Zimmerman, First Great Triumph: How Five Americans Made Their Country a World Power (New York: Farrar,
Straus and Giroux, 2002), 367.
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McKinley administration’s legitimate intentions, Elihu Root ushered in a new incarnation of that
same ordered liberty that had prevailed since Jefferson. Root’s study of the British Empire led
him to reject imperialism.8 The U.S. committed itself to nothing more than a colonial holding of
the Spanish islands and implemented a modified American constitutional model to account for
local eccentricities. Without Root’s quelling the appeals of American expansionists, U.S. foreign
policy may have taken a drastically different direction in 1899.
Of course, colonial instruction in self-government would face its challenges. Tensions
surfaced as Root sought to resolve a discomforting paradox: America was to sponsor selfgoverning nations, while simultaneously serving as the final arbiter for each island. In order to
construct his elaborate insular designs, Root relied on reports that inevitably mischaracterized
local sentiments. Especially in the Philippines, soldiers at times ridiculed natives and failed to
meet their greater civic duty. Nonetheless, Root ended his tour as secretary in February 1904
having successfully fortified a double-barreled design for order in all of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and
the Philippines: first, where the U.S. had charted the natives on a course to self-government
premised on the constitutional idea of ordered liberty, and second, the order that came with
America reserving the right to intervene in insular affairs, an expanded Monroe Doctrine that put
America at the center of world order.

Despite the significance of Elihu Root’s diplomatic watershed between Manifest Destiny
and a nascent democratic internationalism, three historiographical trends have obstructed an
adequate assessment of its implementation on the Spanish Islands. First, superfluous voices often
obscure Root’s own in the diplomatic narrative. Historians delve into the yellow press, the treaty
fight between imperialists and anti-imperialists, and the rhetoric of social Darwinists bent on
8

For a discussion of Root’s extensive reading on the British Empire, see Zimmerman, 368.
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imposing American civilization on “backwards savages.” Such voices can be detrimental to an
authentic diplomatic history of American sponsorship of self-government. Theodore Roosevelt,
at the height of his jocular and jingoistic days, played a minimal role in Root’s schemes. Antiimperialists mostly misunderstood Root’s intentions and sparred with expansionists also out of
the secretary’s earshot.9 Second, narratives of self-government often restrict their focus to only
one of the three islands. A comprehensive diplomatic history of Root’s watershed policy must
consider his attempts to install ordered liberty on all of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines.10
Finally, the idea of American imperialism has gone unchallenged. At worst, historians use the
Spanish-American War as the basis for political agendas that reflect condemningly on
contemporary American “imperial engagements” abroad.11

9

Among the vast expanse of Spanish-American War diplomatic histories, almost all neglect Elihu Root in
preference for a tumult of more vocal players. To reference but a few hallmark histories that confine Root to a
discussion of, at most, a few pages: Walter LaFeber, The American Age: U.S. Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad,
1750 to the Present (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1994), “Turning Point: The McKinley Years,” 193-230;
Thomas Bender, A Nation among Nations: America’s Place in World History (New York: Hill and Wang, 2006),
“An Empire among Empires,” 182-246; Ernest R. May, Imperial Democracy: The Emergence of America as a Great
Power (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1961), “America’s Imperialism,” 243-263; and Foster Rhea
Dulles, America’s Rise to World Power, 1898-1954 (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1954), “Imperialist
Adventure,” 40-58. Even Julius W. Pratt’s admirable study of American sponsorship of self-government on the
Spanish islands only mentions Root in passing. See Pratt, America’s Colonial Experiment: How the United States
Gained, Governed, and in Part Gave Away a Colonial Empire (New York: Prentice-Hall., 1950), “The Government
of Overseas Possessions: The Evolution of Territorial Self-Government,” 171-239. My qualms with Warren
Zimmerman’s study can be found in the conclusion to this essay.
10
It should come as no surprise to the reader that studies of American sponsorship of self-government on the
individual islands often cast aspersions on American colonial policy. For Cuba, see most especially Louis A. Pérez,
jr., Cuba in the American Imagination: Metaphor and the Imperial Ethos (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North
Carolina Press, 2008); Louis A Pérez, Cuba Under the Platt Amendment, 1902-1934 (Pittsburgh, PA: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1986), “The Imperial Transfer,” 29-55; and Jules R. Benjamin, The United States & Cuba:
Hegemony and Dependent Development, 1880-1934 (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1974), “The
Origins of Hegemony, 1880-1902,” 3-12. For Puerto Rico, see Edward J. Berbusse, S.J., The United States in Puerto
Rico, 1898-1900 (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1966) and Raymond Carr, Puerto Rico:
A Colonial Experiment (New York: New York University Press, 1984), “Colonial Ties,” 17-72. For a few highlights
among the many histories of America’s first fraught years on the Philippines, see especially Stanley Karnow, In Our
Image: America’s Empire in the Philippines (New York: Ballantine Books, 1989); Peter W. Stanley, A Nation in the
Making: The Philippines and the United States, 1899-1921 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974),
“Nation Building,” 81-113; and Glenn Anthony May, Social Engineering in the Philippines: The Aims, Execution,
and Impact of American Colonial Policy, 1900-1913 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980), “American PolicyMakers and Policies,” 3-21.
11
For an extended discussion of this problem, see the “Bibliographical Essay” that concludes this text. Daniel B.
Schirmer is one such historian who has politicized Spanish-American War history to an extravagant degree: in his
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Calling American foreign policy in the wake of the Spanish-American War imperialistic
does a disservice to the exceptional case that Root made in his October 1900 Canton address.
Root’s diplomacy must be viewed not as the muscle flexing of a nascent American empire, but
instead, the international extension of the ordered liberty that had defined American government
since independence. The Spanish-American War marked the birth of international Americanism
– Root’s two conceptions of ordered liberty undergirding a new American foreign policy.
This argument will be substantiated in a two-part study. This essay first considers the
political theory that motivated Root’s conception of ordered liberty as a distinctly “American
idea” and the changes that idea engendered within the aim and mission of the U.S. military. The
second part employs Root’s War Department reports to discuss his trial diplomacy on each of the
three islands, which has been supplemented with material from Congressional reports and
testimonies of the island governors and generals who served as Root’s subordinates from August
1899 through February 1904.

Elihu Root’s American Idea: Ordered Liberty and the New American Great Power
In order to properly assess American sponsorship of self-government in Cuba, Puerto
Rico, and the Philippines, the historian must first consider the outlook of the man who made it all
possible. There have been surprisingly few biographies of Elihu Root. This essay relies
principally on the works of Richard Leopold, Philip Jessup, and Warren Zimmerman.12 Each
duly recounts Root’s attempts to cultivate self-government in the Spanish islands. However,

case, to draw a parallel with American guerilla warfare in Vietnam. See Schirmer, Republic or Empire: American
Resistance to the Philippine War (Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Publishing Company, Inc., 1972).
12
For background on Elihu Root and his years at the War Department, see Zimmerman, “A Lawyer’s Duty,” 123148; Philip C. Jessup, Elihu Root: Volume 1, 1845-1909 (New York: Dodd, Mead, and Company, Inc. 1938),
“Secretary of War,” 215-407; Richard W. Leopold, Elihu Root and the Conservative Tradition (Boston, MA: Little,
Brown and Company, 1954), “Imperialism,” 24-46; and Richard Healy, U.S. Expansionism: The Imperialist Urge in
the 1890s (Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1970), “Elihu Root: A World of Order and Progress,”
144-158.
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none offers a definitive understanding of the man’s political philosophy or how Root’s direction
of America’s colonies derived from that philosophy. Zimmerman identifies Root as a “founder of
American imperialism.”13 Likewise, Leopold titles his chapter on Root’s years as Secretary of
War with the blunt “Imperialism.”14
However, for Elihu Root, U.S. sponsorship of self-government in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and
the Philippines was not an imperial affair in the slightest. Root’s public statements, most
delivered in retrospect after his retirement from government, shed light on his understanding of
ordered liberty as a distinctly American idea – an idea that he considered a diplomatic alternative
to imperialism and would guide U.S. sponsorship of self-government in the Spanish islands.

In its basic form, Elihu Root’s American idea constituted a federalist hybrid of central
order and devolved liberty in national government. In 1907, Root lectured before Yale
University on “The Citizen’s Part in Government.” Root argued that American government
entailed two mindsets: “One tends to carry the independence of local self-government to an
extreme; the other tends to carry the centralization of national government to an extreme.”15 Both
central and local outlooks formed necessary points of reference in the conduct of American
government. At existential moments, the national government took command and subdued local
autonomy, from “the extinction of slavery; to establish a national bank; to charter Pacific
railroads...to acquire and incorporate in the United States additional territory; to acquire and
govern so-called colonial possessions.”16

13

Zimmerman, 482.
Leopold, 24.
15
Elihu Root, “The Citizen’s Part in Government: Lecture delivered May 14, 1907 at Yale University,” in Addresses
on Government and Citizenship, ed. Robert Bacon and James Brown Scott (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1916), 27.
16
Root, Addresses on Government and Citizenship, 28.
14
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A flexible use of order, a tightening of the reins every so often, was needed to preserve
local liberty. Root first cautioned against the regular imposition of central order, which could
deteriorate civic consciousness. “Interference with individual liberty by government should be
jealously watched and restrained, because the habit of undue interference destroys that
independence of character without which in its citizens no free government can endure.”17 The
punitive imposition of order made the executive who overstepped his bounds “a trespasser, a
despoiler, a lawbreaker.”18 Excessive direction from the center softened a civic body’s capacity
for self-advancement. “Weaken individual character among a people by comfortable reliance
upon paternal government and a nation soon becomes incapable of free self-government and fit
only to be governed.”19
Beyond the individual citizen, when the autonomy of local self-government proved
stable, there was little need for a pervasive intrusion from the center. Root touched on his
municipal theory in a January 1909 address. “This country is too large, its people are to
numerous, its interests are too varied and its activity too great for one central government at
Washington to carry the burden of governing all of the country in its local concerns, doing
justice to the rights of the individual in every section.”20 This was a point that distinguished
Americanism from Old World imperialism: greater trust and a greater willingness to devolve
responsibility to local government. Without this trust came the risk of “breaking down the local
self-government of the states.”21 Yet, Root also professed the critical place for central direction.
He identified himself as an “uncompromising nationalist of the school of Alexander Hamilton,”
17

Elihu Root, “Experiments in Government and the Essentials of the Constitution: The Stafford Little Lectures
delivered April 15 and 16, 1913 at Princeton University,” in Addresses on Government and Citizenship, 86.
18
Root, Addresses on Government and Citizenship, 101.
19
Root, Addresses on Government and Citizenship, 86.
20
Elihu Root, “Acceptance of the New York Senatorship: Address to the Legislature of New York, January 28,
1909,” in Addresses on Government and Citizenship, 251.
21
Ibid.
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and expressed his belief in “the exercise of the executive, the legislative and the judicial powers
of the national Government to the full limit of the constitutional grants.”22
If such a template had been so successful for domestic American government, why
should it not serve as a template for other nations? Root blurred domestic and international lines
in his 1907 Yale lectures, claiming that ordered liberty should be heralded as an exemplar ideal
in American foreign policy. “We find that our system of government which has been built up in
this practical way through so many centuries...has done more to preserve liberty, justice,
security, and freedom of opportunity for many people for a long period and over a great portion
of the earth, than any other system of government ever devised by man.”23 The American idea’s
international dimension would be reemphasized in an October 1914 speech, entitled “The Spirit
which Makes a Nation Live.” It was America’s obligation, “To set for the world a standard of
true liberty and true justice...to teach our friends and neighbors the secret of the great judgment
of our free democracy, that they may reverence it and preserve it always.”24
Root believed in the American idea’s transferability because he was also a practitioner in
conservative revolution. The constitutional contours of ordered liberty shifted subtly with the
times to meet the exigencies of national interest. Root captured this concept through his fall 1914
lectures as President of the New York State constitutional committee. Root implored that the
committee, “preserve as well as improve. While we seek to adapt the machinery of government
to changing conditions, we are still to preserve the great body of rights and liberties which has
grown through many centuries of political and juridical development.”25 Root advocated an

22

Root, Addresses on Government and Citizenship, 254.
Root, Addresses on Government and Citizenship, 88.
24
Elihu Root, “The Spirit which Makes a Nation Live: Address at the Dinner of the American Bar Association,
October 22, 1914,” in Addresses on Government and Citizenship, 501-502.
25
Elihu Root, “Opening Address as President of the Constitutional Convention, State of New York, April 6, 1915,”
in Addresses on Government and Citizenship, 165.
23
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evolution of governmental responsibilities that maintained the core philosophical precepts of
American constitutional government. “Where changes are needed they should be made fearlessly
and thoroughly but in such a manner, with such relation to existing custom and opinion as to be
natural developments from the life of the people of the state.”26 Root stressed that the
committee’s work remain mindful of the distinctly American idea: “The test of capacity for selfgovernment is to be found in the people’s ability to create institutions which will at once
preserve liberty and maintain order.”27
Root had always believed the American lawyer a uniquely adept practitioner of
conservative revolution. In a June 1904 address, he noted that, “In all this field of the law
regulating the relations of citizens to each other, the proper function of the lawyer is to promote
rational progress; to maintain stability against all fads and crude innovations and at the same
time to keep the development of the law moving with equal step abreast of the progress of the
age.” The lawyer possessed an eye for flexible accommodation to local circumstance: “Lessons
are to be learned from other countries. Practical common sense is to be applied to outworn
rules.”28 It was his own legal background that drove Root to believe himself capable of instilling
ordered liberty in the Spanish islands. Root’s religious passion for the federal American
constitution and his articulation of the need for conservative revolution from time to time –
modifying the periphery without disabusing the core – were critical to his new American
diplomacy.

26

Root, Addresses on Government and Citizenship, 166.
Elihu Root, “A Study of the Proposed Constitution: Address at a Dinner of the Republican Club of New York,
October 18, 1915,” in Addresses on Government and Citizenship, 214.
28
Elihu Root, “Some Duties of American Lawyers to American Law: Commencement Address before the Yale Law
School, New Haven, June 27, 1904,” in Addresses on Government and Citizenship, 422.
27
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Root intended to fuse ordered liberty with conservative revolution in sponsoring selfgovernment in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. Root reflected in a June 27, 1904 address
that American law could never transpose itself perfectly in a foreign context. In August 1899,
There were those who thought it our duty to give to the people of Cuba, of Porto Rico,
and the Philippines the blessings of the common law. A careful study of the subject,
however, soon led to the conclusion that these people already had in force an admirable
body of municipal law, regulating their rights and obligations, and far better adapted to
their needs than the system of rules which we prize so highly for our own conduct.29
Root noted that his designs for the islands had derived from his study of America’s “adapting the
laws of Louisiana to the new condition following the cession of that territory to the United States
from Spain.”30 Conservative revolution in American constitutional government had played out
through Manifest Destiny and would continue to serve as a model for America’s insular
sponsorship of self-government.
Root’s March 13, 1915 address, “The Lawyer of Today,” presented perhaps the most
salient glimpse into his vision for the islands. Root project was “the work of applying to some
ten millions of people in Cuba and Porto Rico and the Philippines, the principles of American
liberty.”31 The key difficulty was tailoring the basic constitutional framework to account for local
circumstance. Root reflected that, “The problem was to match those principles which are
declared in our constitutions...to the customs and the laws of peoples which had come down from
the Spain of Philip the Second and the Inquisition.” Root could not act alone. As chief pastor, he
required missionaries of the American idea to make ordered liberty a reality. He relied on three,
in particular:
Through the strong and sagacious control of Governor Taft in the Philippines; through
the sound administrative instincts and devotion to duty of Leonard Wood in Cuba;
29

Root, Addresses on Government and Citizenship, 420.
Ibid.
31
Elihu Root, “The Lawyer of Today: Address before the New York County Lawyers Association, New York City,
March 13, 1915,” in Addresses on Government and Citizenship, 504.
30
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through the loyalty of George W. Davis, and his successors in Porto Rico, those
principles of justice, principles of state morality, which we have embodied in our
constitutions, constitutions which are but the expression of the conception of individual
liberty that has grown through a thousand years of Anglo-Saxon freedom, proved still to
be vital.32
Consummating their work would be a new model American military, no longer simply a
force for self-defense, but now engineers of humanitarian stability. Root’s reforms of the War
Department included enhanced provisions for military education, which the secretary hoped
would better soldierly conduct on the islands.33 Root noted in his tribute to “The American
Soldier” that the solider remained always “an American citizen...He carries with him not the
traditions of a military empire, but the traditions of a self-governing people. He comes from a
land...where every citizen has learned that obedience to law, and respect for the results of
popular elections, is a part of the order of nature.”34 Perhaps, Root hoped, these men could serve
as exemplars before the inspired islanders.

There remained a second way of conceiving Root’s American idea. Ordered liberty
would shape not only America’s sponsorship of self-government, but also prove the theoretical
framework for a new American diplomacy. Root believed that, just as order and liberty should
maintain stasis within republican societies, so the U.S. reserved the right to maintain a loose
order over a community of otherwise autonomous nations. When it became a matter of U.S.
geostrategic interest to intervene in a troubled nation, America had every right to do so.
Root expanded on this notion in his April 1914 retrospective, “The Real Monroe
Doctrine.” President James Monroe’s 1823 doctrine had proclaimed an anti-imperial dictate:
32

Root, Addresses on Government and Citizenship, 505.
See Elihu Root, “Military Education: West Point and the Army War College,” in The Military and Colonial
Policy of the United States, 387-400.
34
Elihu Root, “The American Soldier: Address by the Secretary of War at the Marquette Club in Chicago, October
7, 1899,” in The Military and Colonial Policy of the United States, 11.
33
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“The American Continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and
maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European
Powers.”35 The implication was that America maintained a responsibility to guarantee selfdetermination in the New World.
It is impossible that the allied Powers should extend their political system to any portion
of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can any one believe
that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is
equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition, in any form, with
indifference.36
The times mandated an updating of the Monroe Doctrine to account for a nascent
American great power. The outdated doctrine “concerned itself only with the occupation of
territory in the New World to the subversion or exclusion of a pre-existing American
government. It has not otherwise any relation to the affairs of either American or European
states.”37 Root proposed a corollary. Although the U.S. would sponsor self-governing nations, it
reserved the right to intervene and inhibit self-determination.
It cannot be claimed that great and powerful states shall forego their just rights against
smaller and less powerful states...the great state ought to be especially considerate and
gentle in the assertion and maintenance of its position; ought always to base its acts not
upon a superiority of force, but upon reason and law; and ought to assert no rights against
a small state because of its weakness...in all this the Monroe Doctrine is not concerned at
all.38
Root grew miffed at critics who accused the U.S., “of playing the role of school master, of
assuming the superiority of guardianship,”39 much as he condemned Bryan’s associates for
leveling the imperial allegation against McKinley in 1900. He conceived the issue as instead a
matter of the natural responsibilities that came with America residing at the center of world
35

Elihu Root, “The Real Monroe Doctrine: Presidential Address at the Eighth Annual Meeting of the American
Society of International Law, Washington, April 22, 1914,“ in Addresses on International Subjects, ed. Robert
Bacon and James Brown Scott (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1916), 105.
36
Root, Addresses on International Subjects, 106.
37
Root, Addresses on International Subjects, 117.
38
Root, Addresses on International Subjects, 116-117.
39
Root, Addresses on International Subjects, 119.
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order. Intervention did not constitute imperial aggression; the U.S. would “intervene by force to
prevent or end an occupation of territory” 40 only to restore order within the family of nations.
American sponsorship of self-government in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines
formed the crucible through which Elihu Root redefined the Monroe Doctrine for an American
great power on the basis of ordered liberty: the United States serving as the foundation of order
in a community of otherwise self-governing nations. Root’s new American diplomacy would
later be codified with President Theodore Roosevelt’s December 1904 corollary to the Monroe
Doctrine. “All that this country desires is that the other republics on this continent shall be happy
and prosperous; and they cannot be happy and prosperous unless they maintain order within their
boundaries and behave with a just regard for their obligations toward outsiders.”41 Roosevelt
argued in a subsequent address that an American preserver of order was not imperialistic. “An
idea had become prevalent that our assertion of the Monroe Doctrine implied or carried with it an
assumption of superiority and of a right to exercise some kind of protectorate over the countries
to whose territory that doctrine applies. Nothing could be further from the truth.”42 The
roughrider had learned a thing or two from Root’s meticulous insular designs. Roosevelt’s
corollary to the Monroe Doctrine was but one critical byproduct of America’s successful
sponsorship of self-government in the wake of the Spanish-American War.

Cuba: The Intuitive Application of Root’s American Idea
Of all the islands that fell under U.S. auspices, Cuba was by far the easiest in which to
implement ordered liberty. Local sentiments, and the response to those sentiments coordinated
by the preceding department under Russell Alger, played to Root’s American idea before he
40
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even took office as Secretary of War. Root did not have to deal in Cuba, as he would in the
Philippines, with the jarring paradox of sponsoring self-government by passing through the
intersection of annexation, a symbolic affront that cast America in the same light as imperial
Spain. Instead, Congress had passed on April 20, 1898 a “Joint Resolution for the recognition of
the independence of the people of Cuba.” The island’s abhorrent conditions “shocked the moral
sense of the people of the United States” and formed “a disgrace to Christian civilization.” The
Congress thus ruled per an amendment proposed by Senator Henry M. Teller,
That the people of Cuba are, and of right to be, free and independent...that the
Government of Spain at once relinquish its authority in the island of Cuba...that the
United States...disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction,
or control over said Island except for the Pacification thereof, and asserts its
determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the
Island to its people.43
Cuba maintained an active representation in American public opinion and Congressional
lobbying. Most assertive was the Cuban Junta, whose handbook Cuba at a Glance described the
effects of General Valeriano Weyler’s disastrous reconcentration policy. “Since October, 1896,
800,000 peaceful Cubans, country people, have been driven from their homes and herded in the
adjacent towns and cities, their dwellings burnt behind them.”44 Weyler’s brutes had uprooted
Cuban families and separated farmers from their crops. “Four hundred thousand of them have
died by starvation. The others are living skeletons, walking through the towns begging.”45
Human suffering poured through the yellow press, detailing even “babies with the skin drawn so
tightly over their little bodies that the bones showed through as plain as the rings under a
glove...protesting as loudly as they could against the treatment which the world was giving
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them.”46 Major-General J.M. Rodriguez remarked in correspondence that, “The relation of the
pictures of misery and horror which we have witnessed would be never ending were we to
narrate them all.”47 The message was clear: inaction would have made the U.S. an abettor to
crimes against humanity.
However, the Cuban Junta had intentions that transcended mere humanitarian assistance.
Their secondary aim was anti-colonial self-determination. Surrogates cast the cause of “Cuba
Libre” in the same mold as the American Revolution. Cuba at a Glance described a history of
colonial chafing that dated back 30 years. “In 1868, when it was proposed still further to tax
them, they rose in arms...Carlos M. de Cespedes, a lawyer of Bayamo, with 128 poorly equipped
men, issued a declaration of independence on the plantation of Yara, and within a few weeks he
was at the head of 10,000 men, badly armed but determined.”48 The ragtag band of guerilla
fighters soon turned their eyes to self-government. “By April, 1869, a constitution for a
republican form of government was drawn up. It provided for a president, vice president, cabinet
and a legislature. It abolished slavery, and under it Cespedes was elected president, Francisco
Aguilero vice president, and a legislature convened.”49
T. Estrada Palma, President of the Cuban Junta, fronted the 1898 publication with a
convincing riposte. “History proves that the independence of a people has always been born of
sacrifice. In no instance, however, has there been such suffering, sacrifice, and abnegation as was
demanded of the Cuban people.”50 Palma knew that Cuba’s historical commitment to
republicanism would captivate the McKinley Administration. From the ash heap of Spanish
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misrule, “they would form a new nation, ruled by the highest type of government – of, for, and
by the people...one more republic is added to the American nations.”51 Elihu Root would have
found General Ramon Blanco’s republicanism especially compelling. The Cuban-American
victory had “offered to the world, as a special case of history, one of the most beautiful triumphs
of liberty, united with the cause of order.”52
The Cuban revolutionaries acknowledged the debt they incurred to the United States.
Following McKinley’s declaration of war after the February 16 sinking of the Maine, General-inChief Maximo Gomez relayed a flourishing tribute. “The people who are saved from extinction
and whose evils your gifts assuage are the people for whose liberty we daily shed our blood on
the fields of battle...I am so deeply moved at the wave of compassion which agitates your noble
country.”53 Palma acknowledged simply that, “Only in the United States was there sympathy for
the oppressed and the outraged.”54

Elihu Root believed that the insurgents’ trust could facilitate the imposition of ordered
liberty in Cuba. Root recognized that for Cuba, independence could never really concern selfdetermination – at least, when self-determination was correctly defined as a truly independent
demonstration. Cuba had won independence only with American support. Given Weyler’s
humanitarian disaster, the U.S. was also in no position to leave the island in its aggrieved state.
Palma was more temperate than revolutionaries like the radical self-determationist José Martí
and requested U.S. assistance. Circumstances could not have been more fortuitous for Root to
implement his double-barreled design for ordered liberty: fortifying self-governing institutions
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upon a stable humanitarian basis, and with the 1902 Platt Amendment, codifying America’s
exclusive right to intervene and preserve order should an external threat menace Cuba’s war-won
liberties.
Root outlined his plans for Cuban self-government in his 1899 “Principles of Colonial
Policy.” He first stressed that America’s insular presence was only temporary. “The control
which we are exercising in trust for the people of Cuba should not be, and of course will not be,
continued any longer than is necessary to enable that people to establish a suitable government to
which the control shall be transferred.”55 Root feared America’s image as a ‘trespasser and
despoiler’ and sought an end game whereby government was transferred to a Cuban people,
“able to maintain order and discharge international obligations.”56 Root delineated U.S.
obligations: “Our present duty is limited to giving every assistance in our power to the
establishment of such a government, and to maintaining order and promoting the welfare of the
people of Cuba during the period necessarily required for that process.”57 The U.S. would tighten
the reins of order only so as to fortify the foundation on which an autonomous Cuban republic
could stand.
Even in Cuba, such a mission would not be easy. Major General M.C. Butler believed
that the Cuban rebels’ independent streak would chafe under American colonization. “Our real
trouble is going to be with the insurgents and their sympathizers...They have been conducting a
desperate struggle for three years against the direst tyranny and oppression that ever afflicted
mankind, and, although they did not achieve their independence and get relief by their unaided
efforts, they feel that they made a gallant struggle for liberty and are entitled to consideration on
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that account.”58 Gratitude would only go so far through a protracted American occupation. The
amount of control that Root and his subordinates exercised would require great finesse. Too
much of a punitive order would cultivate animosity; too much autonomy could breed instability.
Although Cuban surrogates appealed to the island’s rich republican intellectual history,
Root did not want to rush the transition given the island’s complementary history of subjection.
Palma was exceptional; training a population that had known only empire for republican civic
life would prove a heftier enterprise. “The fact...that probably two-thirds of the people of the
island are unable to read and write; that the people in general have had no experience in any real
self-government, but have been for centuries under the dominion of arbitrary power...make it
necessary to proceed somewhat slowly in the formation of a government.”59 Undoubtedly, Root
was selling the Cuban people a bit short. Yet this was not the rhetoric of a diplomat bent on
subjecting an inferior civilization to American imperial dictates. The U.S. would not confer
administrative authority to a Weyler. American civil and military authorities hoped to expedite a
governmental transition per the April 1898 resolution. President McKinley was now a vocal
advocate of Root’s policy, delivering public addresses that conspicuously adopted the rhetoric of
ordered liberty.60
Elihu Root’s sponsorship of Cuban self-government would comprise a play of three acts:
first, providing humanitarian assistance, civic education, and measures for economic stability;
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second, implementing a constitution by which Cuban authorities could maintain internal order;
and finally, preserving America’s right to intervene through the 1902 Platt Amendment.
Ordered liberty could not prevail in Cuba without first shoring up the welfare of the
island’s devastated people. Major General Leonard Wood adeptly commandeered this
humanitarian mission. Wood described his first projects of January 1899: “My
instructions...were to make roads, clean up the towns, feed the people, establish municipal courts,
and to send...men freely and in a widespread manner among the people, and to assure them that
we were among them to help them and not harm them.”61 Establishing this basic trust would
prove critical in the early phase of American intervention. Root further enhanced public works in
his first months as secretary. “Thorough and systematic inspections were made, sanitary corps
were organized, streets were cleaned, sewers were opened, cesspools and sinks were emptied,
and public and private buildings were disinfected.”62 Deaths from Yellow fever plummeted in
1899.63
In 1900, Root turned his attention to primary education. Thanks to Superintendent Alex
E. Frye’s committed work, Root could soon report that, “All over the island the old Spanish
barracks and barracks occupied by American troops, which have been withdrawn are being
turned into schoolrooms after thorough renovation. The pressure for education is earnest and
universal.” 64 The insular treasury appropriated over four million dollars, and 1,281 Cuban
teachers received formal training.65 Root also implemented measures to shore up Cuba’s
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economy. He was the lead driver of the 1901 reciprocal treaties that leveled tariff rates between
Cuba and the United States. Cuban farmers boosted their sugar exports and made up for missed
yields. Economic stability was tied to public order: “More than half of the people of the island
are depending directly or indirectly upon the success of that industry. If it succeeds we may
expect peace, plenty, domestic order...If it fails...poverty and starvation, disorder and anarchy
will ensue.”66 American and Cuban trade cooperation enhanced agricultural and economic
stability, and hence, paved a stronger foundation for Cuban self-government.
Following these humanitarian successes, Root turned to constitutional government. The
U.S. would preserve those institutions adaptable to America’s own, and in others, institute
reforms, “as shall serve to put the business of government in fairly good condition when a
complete Cuban administration finally assumes control of the island.”67 On June 16, 1900,
elections were held to determine Cuba’s municipal officers. Root proudly recounted that, “The
boards of registration and election were composed of Cubans selected by the Cubans themselves.
No United States soldier or officer was present at or in the neighborhood of any polling place.
There was no disturbance.”68 The U.S. still closely monitored preparations for national selfgovernment. Prior to the November 1900 constitutional convention, on Root’s orders, Wood
reminded the Cuban delegates that, “The constitution must be adequate to secure a stable,
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orderly, and free government.”69 Time and again emerged Root’s federal idea: Cubans driving
forward self-government, with only subtle U.S. encouragement.
Meanwhile, Root tempered the second barrel of order that would shape the future course
of Cuban-American diplomacy. The ideal Cuba would be self-governing, but never truly selfdetermining. In his February 1901 War Department Report, Root outlined the critical premises
by which the U.S. would reserve the right to intervene in the island should some existential threat
emerge. In accordance with the tradition of “Jefferson and Monroe and John Quincy Adams,”
Root wrote that, “The United States has, and will always have, the most vital interest in the
preservation of the independence which she has secured for Cuba, and in preserving the people
of that island from the domination and control of any foreign power whatever.”70 Americans had
become, “the guarantors of a stable and orderly government in that island.”71 This set the
foreground for Senator Oliver Platt’s amendment to a March 2, 1901 military appropriations act:
The government of Cuba consents that the United States may exercise the right to
intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government
adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty, and for discharging
the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the Treaty of Paris on the United
States.72
Root’s provisions for ensuring America’s standing as the final arbiter of Cuban order
were not limited to the Platt Amendment. Wood’s subsequent diplomacy produced optical
concessions to a seemingly autonomous Cuban government and military guarantees for a U.S.
protector. Following Palma’s February 24, 1902 election as president, Root clarified to Wood the
limits of American withdrawal: “In the instructions already communicated to you as to the
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withdrawal of the army from Cuba there is a provision that you may have a small force of
artillery troops...The posts to be thus provisionally garrisoned by the military forces of the
United States will be designated to you.”73 Root had Wood secure America’s right to free transit.
“You will obtain the necessary assurances that the right of transit of individuals, detachments, or
military organizations to and from the United States...shall not be denied, impeded, or interfered
with.”74
Simultaneously, Root crafted the optics of a truly free and independent Cuba. “Impress
upon the commander of the artillery forces...the importance of refraining from even the
appearance of interference in governmental or political affairs.” Root provided for a number of
cultural tributes symbolizing a conclusive transition from American rule to Cuban selfgovernment. “He will render appropriate military honors to the Cuban flag and to all officers of
the Cuban Government who are entitled thereto, and will treat its representatives with whom he
may come into personal or official contact with the greatest courtesy and consideration upon all
occasions.”75 Cuba embodied the American idea of ordered liberty perfected in its diplomatic
application. While America reserved the right to intervene, she would in no way impose on an
otherwise self-governing Cuba, with internal order now predicated on a republican constitution.

The United States ended its colonial mission with the withdrawal of American forces
from Cuba on June 10, 1902. Leonard Wood described the spirited festivities that brought
together more than 150,000 people of the sister republics: “The Cuban flag was hoisted...the
national anthem was played and our troops saluted the flag...There was immense interest and
enthusiasm displayed in the transfer, and it would have been impossible for any people to have
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shown more friendship and cordiality to the representatives of another nation.”76 Elihu Root
wished his friend Palma well. “Believe in my heartfelt congratulations upon the inauguration of
the Republic which the people of Cuba and the people of the United States have fought and
labored together to establish...I bid you godspeed and on this happy day wish for Cuba for all
time liberty and order, peace and prosperity.”77 Palma reciprocated his gratitude to all of Root,
Wood, and President Roosevelt.78
Decades later, the U.S. would be condemned as the imperial aggressor that kept Cuba
from greatness. Yet at its inception in the summer of 1902, Cuba embodied an indisputable
success story in ordered liberty. Leland Hamilton Jenks, an avid anti-imperialist historian,
conceded in his 1928 Our Cuban Colony that Elihu Root was no imperialist. On the contrary, he
had tied the virtues of American government to the diplomacy of a nascent American great
power. “There can be no serious question that the United States, under the leadership of
Roosevelt and Root, intended the Republic of Cuba to be an honest attempt of state-building.
When one has said that, he has placed Root and Roosevelt...as statesmen who in an age of
imperialism encouraged self-government.”79

Puerto Rico: “To become Americanos”
Puerto Rico was an island lost in the shadow of its eminently more popular Caribbean
neighbor. It did not have as its lobby a force comparable to the Cuban Junta, urging the United
States to fulfill her Christian duty to a republican disciple. In Washington, Muñoz Rivera and
Mariano Abril were the chief surrogates on behalf of Puerto Rican interests.80 Following
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America’s April 1899 signing of the Paris Peace Treaty, Abril described the pair’s primary work
as “breaking the wall of ice formed by the indifference with which these politicians look upon
our affairs.”81 Rivera communicated his interests bluntly: Puerto Rico aspired to secure its own
government with minimal outside control from the United States; the people desired the
termination of American military government on the island; and Puerto Rico did not favor
outright independence, but instead, union with the American people under a territorial form of
government.82 Whereas Cuba requested assistance to secure national independence, Puerto Rico
accepted its semi-colonial relation to the U.S. with hopes of statehood lying in the wait.
Secretary Alger’s subordinates had no interest in conferring self-governing autonomy to
Puerto Rico. While the cause of “Cuba Libre” tugged at the republican heartstrings of
McKinley’s generals, Puerto Rico was treated as a nominal conquest. For the first two years of
American rule there, self-government constituted nothing more than a few farcical handouts
from America’s military “czars.” Upon becoming governor in October 1898, General Nelson A.
Miles instructed his field commanders that, “It becomes their [Puerto Rico’s] duty to yield
obedience to the authority of the United States, the power of the military occupant being absolute
and supreme and immediately operating upon the political conditions of the inhabitants.”83
General M.C. Butler dismissed Puerto Rico as the prize won for liberating Cuba. “The conditions
in Puerto Rico are very different, and much more easy of control and solution. We are there by
right of conquest, pure and simple. The territory and people are ours. Here we are conquerors in
one sense, and another not.”84 The American military that had set about building humanitarian
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stability in Cuba assumed a different guise in Puerto Rico. In early 1899, a flood of irate
editorials poured through Puerto Rican newspapers, condemning American soldiers for drunken
brawling and harassing the natives.85
Dr. Henry K. Carroll, commissioned by Alger to observe the island, concluded in the fall
of 1899 that change was in order. Although the island’s populace had embraced American order,
Carroll asserted, it was time to give them a level of insular responsibility that at least matched the
concessions conferred by Spain’s 1897 Autonomous Charter. Serving in the Spanish Cortes had
equipped Puerto Ricans with the capacity for self-government. The islanders were “better
prepared than were the people of Mexico, or of the colonies in Central and South America,
which have one after another emancipated themselves and entered upon the duties and privileges
of self-government.” Their affinity for the U.S. made them a reliable student, for “they will not
foment revolutions or insurrections.” Carroll prescribed a policy that made for a watershed from
Manifest Destiny: “Let Porto Rico have local self-government after the pattern of our Territories
and she will gain by her blunders, just as cities and States in our own glorious Republic are
constantly learning.”86

Elihu Root sought to reverse the military czars’ direction and implant a local autonomy in
Puerto Rico that did justice to the American idea of ordered liberty, mostly affirming Carroll’s
recommendations. Rather than explore Root’s design for Puerto Rico, historians have
traditionally focused more on the hair-splitting constitutional debates then playing out in
Congress. Root was never interested in debating the merits of statehood versus territorial
autonomy and deferred to Congress on all constitutional matters. He was solely interested in
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making ordered liberty a reality, both in sponsoring Puerto Rican self-government and ensuring
that America maintained the reins of diplomatic order.
Root believed that ordered liberty would come easily to Puerto Rico. He began his 1899
report by noting, “The problem of civil government in the islands yielded or ceded by Spain
presents in the simplest form in the case of Porto Rico.”87 The critical tasks of cultivating insular
self-government and ensuring America’s right to intervene came smoothly with “the cheerful and
unanimous desire of its people, who are peaceful and loyal and eager for the benefits to be
derived from the application of American ideas of government...There is no obstacle.”88
Although the islanders had embraced American order, Root did not believe that they were ready
for unrestricted self-government. Education was lacking. As with Cuba, Root concluded that, “it
is impossible that a people with this history – only ten percent of whom can read or write –
should ever have acquired any real understanding of the way to conduct a popular
government.”89 Puerto Rico also endured a humanitarian disaster comparable to Weyler’s
reconcentration with a hurricane that struck the island on August 8, 1899. The U.S. amplified its
presence to restore stability, for “the result of the disaster was the loss of about three thousand
lives...Over one hundred thousand people were reduced to absolute destitution, without homes or
food or means to obtain food.”90 Root ordered $392,342 in emergency food provisions, and
subsequently, “the entire army in Porto Rico became a relief corps.”91 As with Cuba, Root urged
Congress to remove customs duties to restore depressed sugar and tobacco commodities.92
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Rivera and Abril, members of Puerto Rico’s republican faction, grew frustrated at an
American-sponsored civil government that conferred fewer liberties than Spain’s 1897
Autonomous Charter. However, Root had deemed the charter an inadequate template for
republican self-government. Intellectuals like Rivera and Abril were, “highly educated and able
men, public-spirited and patriotic...but there are not enough of them to make a working
government which would be anything but an oligarchy.”93 Educated Puerto Ricans had to learn
to cope with legislation unruly to their sensibilities and concede to majority rule. “Porto Ricans,
as a people, have never learned the fundamental and essential lesson of obedience to the decision
of the majority...before the people of Porto Rico can be fully intrusted with self-government they
must first learn the lesson of self-control and respect for the principles of constitutional
government, which require acceptance of its peaceful decisions.”94 The secretary provided an
arena by which the Puerto Ricans could demonstrate their capacity for self-government. “A form
of government should be provided for Porto Rico which will assure the kind of administration to
which we are accustomed, with just as much participation on the part of Porto Ricans as is
possible without enabling their inexperience to make it ineffective, and with opportunity for
them to demonstrate their increasing capacity to govern themselves with less and less
assistance.”95 The Puerto Rican and Cuban blueprints for self-government had begun to align,
despite one island seeking independence and the other a permanent connection to the U.S.
Although Root bypassed constitutional specifics, he did not neglect the institutional path
that would transition the island from military to civil government. Root’s 1899 prospectus
outlined a model for civil government that came just a hair’s breath from the full law codified
with the April 1900 Foraker Act. There would be a governor, appointed by the president; a
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legislature, also appointed by the president, and a minority of delegates selected by the people; a
supreme court and trial courts grounded in American law; and municipal mayors and councils
left free to administer local government.96 Naturally, the reins of American order would slacken
over time. Root ultimately intended for the Puerto Ricans to assume a degree of federated
autonomy that more than matched the Autonomous Charter. He mandated that there should be,
“no greater number of Americans from the United States than are necessary for the introduction
of the methods of the administration in which Americans have been trained and Porto Ricans
have not.”97
Root also built from the virtuous elements left outstanding from Spain’s Autonomous
Charter. He wrote that, “The civil code established by Spain...in force at the time of the cession,
is an excellent body of laws, adequate in the main, and adapted to the customs and conditions of
the people. It should be continued in force, with such gradual modification as experience from
time to time suggests.”98 This proved a salient manifestation of Root’s skill in conservative
revolution: tweaking the periphery and accommodating local circumstance, but never so as to
diminish the first principles of American government.

In May 1899, President McKinley appointed General George W. Davis Governor of
Puerto Rico. Davis would preside over the transition from military to civil rule on the island. He
would also become one of Elihu Root’s three most trusted missionaries of ordered liberty, along
with Leonard Wood in Cuba and William Howard Taft in the Philippines.
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Davis was the first military governor to credit the Puerto Ricans’ intelligence and
acknowledge their capacity for self-government. He expressed this sentiment before the House
Committee on Insular Affairs on February 5, 1900. “The Puerto Rican is quick to learn, has an
acute mind, and good perceptive faculties...I have known no more apt pupils anywhere than
those native Puerto Ricans, both white and black.”99 This was not the conquest language of Miles
or Butler, nor the rhetoric of a racist or social Darwinist. Davis was inspired by the natives, who
“rendered...very cordial assistance, and have anticipations of great benefits yet to come which
have not materialized.”100 As with Wood in Cuba, Davis sought to earn the peoples’ trust by
feeding their insight into his administration. Davis reflected that, upon arriving in Puerto Rico, “I
found myself embarrassed in many cases by my lack of acquaintance with the people, their laws,
customs and institutions.” He therefore determined “to constitute an advisory council, all natives
of the islands.”101
Davis saw eye to eye with Root in believing that, although the islanders certainly had the
potential for self-government, Puerto Rico was not yet ready. When asked how they would rule
independently, Davis responded with a terse “Very badly.”102 During the previous elections for
the legislature’s lower chamber, only 30,000 votes were cast to represent a population of almost
500,000. That was with “general interest in the election and no failure to register.”103 Davis
echoed Root’s point regarding the need for universal civic competency before empowering a
national republican government. “The people generally have no conception of political rights
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combined with political responsibilities. Privileges they all desire, but they seem to have very
little conception of political responsibility and the obligation of all to bow to the will of the
majority.”104 Davis remained confident that through work “in the municipalities, and, in a certain
degree, in this legislative council,” 105 the people of Puerto Rico would develop a capacity for
territorial self-government with limited American oversight.
Davis’s remarks may have rankled the likes of Rivera and Abril, but they were in no way
unfounded or premised on the arbitrary muscle flexing of an imperial America. Lucas Amadeo,
president of the Puerto Rican agricultural society, testified that same month to the virtues of joint
rule: “There exists in Puerto Rico every element for self-government, but of course they would
prefer to have somebody more accustomed to it to initiate them – to show them and give them
the benefit of their experience – and then the Puerto Ricans could very well govern
themselves.106 Further testimonials reflected the trust that Puerto Ricans conferred in American
institutions. Tulio Larrinaga, a San Juan civil engineer, stated on January 20, 1900 that although
he believed “nothing short of a Territorial government will fully satisfy the people of the island,”
the people were yet willing to “accept whatever the United States Government will do in the
matter, as we feel assured the Government will do us justice.”107 Major Azel Ames, a sanitary
inspector for the U.S. army who had lived in Puerto Rico through the Spanish-American
transition, remarked on the islanders’ potential and understanding:
Considering that they have been under four hundred years of oppression, they exhibit a
remarkable degree of resiliency, or ‘rebound,’ a most remarkable individuality
considering they have been under the heel of a brutal taskmaster all these years...they
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have a great desire to learn...that is a typical thing of the earnestness in the island – to
become Americanos.108
At any rate, the residual humanitarian aid injected by American peacekeepers following the
August 1899 hurricane, along with Root’s periodic attempts to halt Spanish creditor demands,
made it clear that the United States was not inclined to leave the islanders to their own
devices.109
Even before the Foraker Act enabled Puerto Rico’s official transition to civil government
on May 1, 1900, Davis and Root had performed the same three-act play yet proceeding in Cuba.
The U.S. had met humanitarian needs and stabilized the insular economy. Root had drafted a
blueprint for civil government that provided for a progressive expansion of the island’s
autonomy and a slow ebbing of American order. There was no need for a Puerto Rican Platt
Amendment. Given that the islanders desired either territorial government or statehood, the U.S.
was ensured carte blanche access in the event some existential threat menaced the island.
Elihu Root’s successful translation of Puerto Rico’s Spanish constitution into
Americanized ordered liberty did not satiate many frustrated islanders desiring clarity on their
constitutional status. However, it would be a mistake to cast Root and his colonial policy under
the imperial brand. Elihu Root and George Davis prevented Puerto Rico from being reduced to
an imperial token. The ordered liberty that prevailed there was more similar than different to that
effected in Cuba. Rather than flesh out the constitutional question in a way that satisfied all
parties, Root shifted his attention to a more pressing matter: the insurgency greeting America’s
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military in the Philippines and the fraught challenge of developing self-government on those
islands.

The Philippines: The Indomitable Idea of Ordered Liberty
President William McKinley presents a complex figure in the narrative of American
sponsorship of self-government, most especially in the case of the Philippines. Did McKinley
pursue an imperial course for America? Or was Philippine annexation simply the last option on
the table, to be renounced within several decades of insular stability? McKinley’s retrospective
account on the Philippine question stands as the most-oft repeated anecdote in Spanish-American
War historiography:
When I realized that the Philippines had dropped into our laps I confess I did not know
what to do with them...I walked the floor of the White house night after night until
midnight...I went down on my knees and prayed to Almighty God for light and
guidance...we could not leave them to themselves – they were unfit for selfgovernment...there was nothing left for us to do but to take them...and to educate the
Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them...And then I went to bed, and went
to sleep, and slept soundly.110
More than any other insular colony, the Philippines have served as the most critical plank
substantiating histories that contend for America’s imperial course in the wake of the SpanishAmerican War.
During his cross-country speaking tour through the winter of 1899, McKinley sold
America’s new colonial course without articulating concrete plans for insular government. His
February 16, 1899 Home Market Club speech in Boston highlighted one of two principles
consistently invoked in his addresses: Philippine annexation stood as the natural consequence of
America’s humanitarian duty. “Did we need their consent to perform a great act for
humanity?...Did we ask their consent to liberate them from Spanish sovereignty, or to enter
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Manila Bay and destroy the Spanish sea-power there? We did not ask these things; we were
obeying a higher moral obligation.”111 A December 15, 1898 speech in Atlanta presented
McKinley’s second refrain: the war brought unity to a nation yet suffering from the residual
wounds of disunion. “Under hostile fire on a foreign soil, fighting in a common cause, the
memory of old disagreements has faded into history. From camp and campaign there comes the
magic healing which has closed ancient wounds and effaced their scars...no small indemnity for
the cost of the war.”112 Humanity and reunion were emotive themes that generated much
applause and exempted McKinley from discussing the hairier questions of government.
McKinley did, however, offer a few scant insights into what sort of government should
take shape in the Philippines. He guaranteed in his February Home Market Club speech, “That
they will have a kindlier government under our guidance, and that they will be aided in every
possible way to be a self-respecting and self-governing people, is as true as that the American
people love liberty and have an abiding faith in their own government and in their own
institutions.” McKinley disavowed any sort of ulterior imperial intention. “No imperial designs
lurk in the American mind. They are alien to American sentiment, thought, and purpose. Our
priceless principles undergo no change under a tropical sun. They go with the flag.”113 Such were
the enigmatic McKinley’s paradoxes: celebrating America’s new domains, but rejecting
imperialism; heralding a common cause abroad to heal lingering sectional tensions, but refusing
to articulate what that cause constituted beyond vague notions of “duty and humanity.”
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McKinley’s speaking tour helped secure passage of the Treaty of Paris. But it did not articulate a
viable foreign policy for a new American great power.

Although the question of insular self-government was beyond his own understanding,
McKinley determined that Elihu Root, merely a soft-spoken New York City lawyer, would be
the best man to reconcile Philippine annexation with Cuban independence and the Puerto Rican
open question under a consistent postwar diplomacy. The Philippines would prove Root’s
toughest challenge yet. Contemporary circumstances did not accommodate U.S. intervention.
The Philippines had neither the republican history of Cuba nor Puerto Rico’s desire for a close
bond with the U.S. The islands were a mix of countless ethnicities. A critical open door to the
Far East, the archipelago was a strategic venue that could not be vacated. Nevertheless, Root
believed that ordered liberty could overcome even these least accommodating of insular
circumstances. In doing so, Root would confront a critical challenge to his American idea: Was
there such a thing as American order so punitive, a military commitment so draining, that it
simply was not worth the long-term costs to the U.S.? Root answered no, given his ideological
conviction in the republican idea and given the responsibilities that came with America’s new
position at the fulcrum of diplomatic order.
Root was well aware of the challenges heading his way. In his October 1899 “American
Soldier” speech, the secretary elaborated on a first obstacle: there was no consistent nationality
on the islands. Cuba projected a strident republican nationalism that had built on a thirty-year
independence movement. Although politically confused, Puerto Rico maintained a consistent
Spanish-speaking nationality. Neither could be said for the Philippines. “Are we fighting the
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Philippine nation? No. There is none. There are hundreds of islands, inhabited by more than sixty
tribes, speaking more than sixty different languages.”114
The second critical challenge came with the Philippines having endured a particularly
illiberal Spanish dominion. Cuba had its longstanding history of republican intellectualism.
Puerto Rico embraced external order, yet also controlled its local situation through the 1897
Autonomous Charter. Spain’s imperial dominion had facilitated neither in the Philippines. Root
expanded on this predicament at the beginning of his 1900 War Department report: “Spanish
authority had for centuries furnished the only controlling force for the maintenance of order in
the Philippine Islands, and upon the destruction of the Spanish power the existing administration
completely ceased to perform its functions and disappeared, leaving a great body of inhabitants,
without training or capacity to organize for self-control, absolutely without government.”115
Felipe Buencamino, a former Secretary of Foreign Affairs for the insurgent government, noted
the dearth of civic education. “With regard to political education, we have absolutely none. We
have never been politicians, and if it did take place at some time it has been with arms in
hand.”116 Root’s designs also distinguished more advanced towns like Manila and Mindanao
from remote tribes that exhibited an underwhelming level of advancement, and consequently
made “civil society thoroughly disorganized.”117
Root’s final challenge was defeating an opponent who represented the antithesis to his
American idea: Emilio Aguinaldo. Congressional Democrats portrayed Aguinaldo as a martyr
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for Philippine independence, a characterization that especially frustrated Root.118 Root found
Aguinaldo even more disconcerting than either the Puerto Rican republican Muñoz Rivera or the
Cuban self-determationist José Martí. Whereas Rivera and Martí had commenced a disordered
rush to self-government, the secretary believed that Aguinaldo had his sights set on military
autocracy. Aguinaldo’s militant nationalism presented an even greater threat than anarchy to his
American idea: “We are fighting against the selfish ambition of a military dictator...who was
permitted to gather all the forces of disorder, all the men who prefer a life of brigandage to a life
of industry...when America was prevented by her international obligations and the faith of her
protocol from interfering.”119
Root substantiated his condemnation of the insurgent government by relying on his
trusted generals’ reports. General Ewell Otis, who served as America’s first military governor of
the islands, reported that, “Under Tagalog domination, which was really the irresponsible
dictatorship of Aguinaldo...there was no rule by which the right or wrong of personal action
could be determined, nor indeed did individual liberty of any kind exist. The so-called insurgent
government...degenerated into a military despotism of low order.”120 Admiral George Dewey
assured in a February 1902 hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that he had
never guaranteed Aguinaldo any right to form an insurgent government. Dewey recalled seeing a
group of insurgents hoist a Filipino flag. “I said, ‘It is not a flag; they have no
government’...There was a sort of reign of terror; there was no government.”121 Undoubtedly
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mislead by biased reporting, and generally a bit green with only two months of experience in
pouring over military matters, Root described the military predicament as a small-scale
insurgency centered on Aguinaldo’s Tagalogs. “Many of them are already engaged in learning
the rudiments of government under the tuition of the American soldier. We are opposed by only
the single tribe of the Tagalogs.”122
The imposition of American order in the Philippines would appear far different from
American endeavors in Puerto Rico and Cuba. Whereas in the latter islands the American
military built order as a humanitarian task force, in the Philippines, U.S. soldiers commenced
military operations against Aguinaldo’s insurgents. The foreignness of the islands created a tense
relationship between anxious American soldiers and wary Filipinos, regardless of their
association with Aguinaldo. None of this mattered to Root, who yet believed that a finessed
balance of liberty and order could make self-government attainable in the Philippines.
Root’s 1899 report mostly traced the military’s attempts to halt Aguinaldo, a critical
stumbling block to achieving local order. He tallied the military gains that earned a small degree
of trust from the Filipinos. In November, American troops near Manila received support from the
Pampangos, just one of many “northerly tribes...unfriendly to the Tagalogs.” The friendly natives
allowed American soldiers and their animals to feed upon the country.123 On November 29,
Aguinaldo’s government in central Luzon was destroyed, with the principal civil and military
leaders taking to guerilla warfare.124 Root ordered General Otis to leave a suitable foundation in
place for the government that was to come. “As rapidly as we have occupied territory, the policy
of inviting inhabitants to return to their peaceful vocations, and aiding them in the
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reestablishment of their local governments, has been followed, and the protection of the United
States has been promised to them.”125
Root’s report also noted the preliminary advancements toward orderly civil government
that poked through an otherwise lurid military landscape. In jurisprudence, “courts have been
organized and the most learned and competent native lawyers have been appointed to preside
over them.” A system of education was introduced to the islands. “It is believed that in the city of
Manila, a greater number of good schools...exist today than at any previous time in the history of
the city.”126 Root was already thinking to the reduction of America’s military presence and
highlighted the value of public works. Roads and trains would “lessen the number of posts and
consequently the number of troops necessary.” Root never averred from his belief that “the
benefits of our control and the sincerity of our professions of good intention...will naturally
follow the benefits of good civil government,”127 and hence, even through the worst days of
guerilla warfare, his mind turned to civic planning.
Only in 1900 could Root begin to truly set the trappings for Filipino self-government.
Root left the task of military clean up to Generals Otis and Arthur MacArthur and pieced
together a set of nascent constitutional principles premised on ordered liberty. Root first sought
to establish common judicial rights and practice throughout the islands, discarding the
unworkable Spanish model. “The Spanish criminal procedure in the islands had been
exceedingly oppressive and regardless of personal rights, and native representatives in the new
courts were very desirous to introduce as speedily as possible the privileges accorded by the laws
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of the United States to its citizens.”128 With the help of interim Filipino attorney-general Don
Florentino Torres, Root prepared a code of criminal procedure on April 23 that “for the first time
affords real protection to the personal rights of persons charged with crime in the Philippine
Islands.”129
Beyond judicial procedure, Root laid a framework for municipal government. National
self-government would be a long-term project, far more difficult to concretize than in the
Caribbean islands. Root thus sought to build self-government on a local basis, creating small
bastions of ordered liberty that would educate a civic body capable of commandeering a larger
national government. Employing Filipino insight, Root issued a March 29 report on his
legislative plan. “For the first time the Philippine people are to exercise the right of suffrage in
the election of municipal officers...With the new municipalities a really autonomous and
decentralized municipal government will be established in the towns.”130 Root hoped to train the
Filipinos with a model for municipal government that made for autonomous local government
with only nominal oversight. “The statute...places in the hands of the municipal practically the
entire administration of the ordinary affairs of government, reserving to the central authority only
such power of supervision and intervention as might be necessary to require the powers vested in
the municipal officers to be exercised with loyalty and good faith.”131
Root conferred to William Howard Taft’s Second Philippine Commission the bigger task
of directing order on the composite archipelago. Root’s instructions to the commission provide
the clearest insight into his blueprint for Filipino self-government. He first asked the
Commission to prioritize municipal government, transferring his own report on that matter
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verbatim to the instructions.132 The Commission’s second priority was the organization of “larger
administrative divisions, corresponding to counties, departments, or provinces, in which the
common interests of many or several municipalities falling within the same tribal lines...may best
be subserved by a common administration.”133 In communicating as much, Root ensured that
provincial government would not join disparate nationalities or Filipinos with starkly divergent
understandings of republican administration. The Commission began directing affairs for the
collective archipelago in September and nation built from the top-down. Burdensome Spanish
taxes were abolished; a quarantine law was enforced; customs and insular revenues were
increased; and standardized public education was funded throughout the islands.134
Root implored the Commission to follow an important standard: that whenever order was
assured, civil government must constitute self-government by native Filipinos. “Wherever
officers of more extended jurisdiction are to be selected in any way, natives of the islands are to
be preferred.”135 The Commission would only step in where this self-governing capacity was
lacking, and only with the intent of buttressing a foundation for Filipino national government.
Conservative revolution again played into Root’s urging of local accommodation. He asked that
the measures “conform to their customs, their habits, and even their prejudices...consistent with
the accomplishment of the indispensable requisites of just and effective government.”136 Root
even deferred to the eccentric customs of isolated tribes, referencing America’s domestic policy
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of accommodating Native Americans.137 He concluded by emphasizing that America had
intervened for Filipino interests and not American interests. “The commission should bear in
mind that the government which they are establishing is designed...for the happiness, peace, and
prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands.”138
Root read verbatim from these instructions in his October 1900 address to the people of
Canton, Ohio. He challenged the Congressional Democrats then pointing to Philippine
annexation as proof-positive evidence of McKinley’s imperial intentions. Root contended that
the commission’s structured path to self-government indicated otherwise. “Is that imperialism?
Will giving that kind of government to these poor people who have suffered so long under
Spanish tyranny degrade the character of this Republic? No.”139 America was only imposing
order to enable the Philippines to maintain its affairs without untoward intervention by any Old
World power. Should Root’s plans come to fruition, the U.S. would no longer require the
commission’s services: the less the external imposition of order, and the more devolved that
liberty was, the better. With enough time and tutelage, the Philippines would master their own
affairs.

Root’s Canton speech neglected the lurid military underbelly residing beneath this
otherwise optimistic picture of a Philippines en route to self-government. MacArthur had
determined to lay down his military arm hard in guerilla fighting. Whereas trust between
islanders and Americans progressively grew in civil government, animosity escalated with the
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growing casualties of war. Root deferred to his generals, and in particular MacArthur, who
insisted on tightening the reins on the Filipinos. Root determined to, “apply more rigidly to the
residents of the archipelago the laws of war touching the government of occupied places.”140 He
ordered the deportation of “sympathizers and agitators.” Root even mandated that Filipinos
perform an oath of loyalty.141 This tightening vice of American military order undermined Root’s
self-governing ideal. For countless Filipinos, the American military appeared nothing more than
imperial Spain’s replacement.
Various reports commissioned by the 57th Congress revealed a mounting distrust among
the islanders then straining beneath American military order. One February 27, 1901 report
transmitted countless petitions against American rule in Cebu Island. For objecting to the oath of
allegiance, residents of Danno province “were thrown into prison and were obliged to work in an
objectionable and mortifying way.”142 The oath frustrated Filipinos who desired to know their
ultimate constitutional relation to the United States. Citizens of the town of Pilar wrote, “We are
forced to take the oath of allegiance, which is most repulsive, not knowing the form of
government to be granted to them by Congress.” The town desired “a suspension of the
hostilities and of a reestablishment of peace, order, and tranquility, but by honorable means.”143
Through the summer of 1900, protest constitutions emerged in villages spanning the whole
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archipelago, with 25 mentioned in this one report alone. Each repudiated the oath and demanded
greater governing responsibility.144 Dissent from the War Department’s tightened strictures
certainly extended beyond Aguinaldo’s Tagalogs.
American public relations were also weak in the Philippines. Spanish propaganda
maligned American intentions, as the native Ramon Reyes Lala described in his February 1901
testimony before the War Department’s Division of Insular Affairs.
Dread...was intensified against the Americans in the accounts given the natives by the
Spanish. The native in the interior, when approached by the American soldier, fell down
upon his knees and begged for mercy, expecting to be at once put to death...When sick
they could not be induced to take medicine from the hands of the American soldier until
convinced that the surgeon did not mean to poison them...When our soldiers would
approach a native mother with her children she would gather them around her, the whole
group fall down trembling and close their eyes that they might meet death without seeing
their supposed murderers.145
The American journalist T.W. Noyes corroborated many of the rumors in a June 1900 piece
published in Washington’s Evening Star. “One of the hardest factors to overcome in the real
pacification of the Filipinos, which is to follow the war, is their resentment of contemptuous
treatment by many of our soldiers, who adopting the term from English residents in Manila, have
systematically spoken of the Filipinos and treated them as ‘niggers.’”146 This scene especially
contrasted with America’s humanitarian task forces contemporaneously endearing themselves to
the Cuban people.
The war’s atrocities and deaths only exacerbated Philippine antagonisms in those first
fraught years as an American colony. MacArthur elaborated on his new hard line policy in a
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December 1900 report to Root. In the armed struggle, “frequent violations of important
provisions of the laws of war have recently manifested themselves, rendering it imperative...that
exemplary punishments attach to the infringement thereof.”147 While the archipelago moved
toward civil government, it remained “necessarily under the rigid restraints of martial law.”148
MacArthur cynically denounced the softness that had for too long characterized U.S. attempts to
bring order to the Philippines. “The fact that such men have not heretofore been held responsible
for their actions is simply an evidence of the solicitude of the United States to avoid all
appearance of harshness in pacifying the islands.”149 MacArthur’s hard line brought about
Aguinaldo’s capture on March 23, 1901. But the annual toll would prove staggering for Filipinos
and Americans alike. At the war’s peak, 70,000 U.S. soldiers were involved, and by the time of
Root’s 1901 report, at least 200,000 natives had been killed.150 The U.S. suffered 4,234
casualties at a $600 million expense.151

Arthur MacArthur merits a moment of deeper consideration in the narrative of Philippine
self-government. His punitive efforts to impose order did more to foster an impression of
American imperialism in Filipino minds than any comparable policy. However, this did not
make MacArthur an imperial agent. Although his tactics to impose order may have done more
harm than good to the cause of Filipino self-government, MacArthur was nonetheless a
committed missionary of ordered liberty.
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General MacArthur reflected in a January 1902 Senate testimony on American intentions
in the Philippines. Like Root, MacArthur described America’s international mission as an
outgrowth of its own constitution and government. He noted that the distinctly American idea,
“our conception of right, justice, freedom, and personal liberty...self-government regulated by
law,” needed translation into a new American foreign policy. “We must regard ourselves simply
as the custodians of imperishable ideas held in trust for the general benefit of mankind...we had
attained a moral and intellectual height from which we were bound to proclaim to all as the
occasion arose the true message of humanity as embodied in the principles of our own
institutions.”152 The U.S. had embarked on a different policy from the imperial powers of the Old
World. “The contrasting idea with our occupation is this: In planting our ideas we plant
something that cannot be destroyed. To my mind the archipelago is a fertile soil upon which to
plant republicanism. Once planted it can never be eradicated...and therefrom will radiate an
influence the appreciation of which it is hard to estimate.”153
Although circumstances were not conducive to self-government, MacArthur echoed
Root’s confidence in the American idea’s transferability. “It is the prerogative of selfgovernment that it adapts itself to every circumstance which can arise. Its institutions, although
sometimes defective, are always appropriate and strong, for they exactly represent the living
conditions of human life.”154 MacArthur also elaborated on the need for a lasting U.S. presence
in the Philippines, given the geostrategic great power game that would play out in the event of a
rushed American departure. “Many nations are looking...with longing eyes. The islands in case
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of our withdrawal would unquestionably become the theater of gigantic political and warlike
operations.”155
MacArthur believed that, in converting the archipelago to the doctrine of ordered liberty,
countless other nations would follow. For MacArthur, this implication took precedence before
the economic benefits of a Far Eastern open door.156 In associating with the American “great
Republic,” the Philippines had become, “a chosen people to carry not only American commerce
but also republican institutions and the principles of personal liberty throughout Asia.”157
MacArthur’s vision touched Root’s own: Future leaders of a republican Philippines would
themselves become missionaries of ordered liberty, the new drivers of a cascading republican
evangelism initiated by an American great power.

As casualties subsided into the summer months of 1901, Root recommended that William
Howard Taft, president of the Second Philippine Commission, be appointed civil governor of the
islands. Taft had opposed MacArthur’s tactics. A self-described anti-imperialist, he watched as
casualties built with a deep internal compunction. Root had reserved for MacArthur as
commander of the military division the ability to exercise authority in areas where the
insurrection persisted.158 Nevertheless, with Taft carrying jurisdiction for 70% of the population,
considerable steps were taken toward Philippine self-government.159 Taft commenced an
assiduous project of nation building. He oversaw the establishment of a regular police force, the
creation of a department of public instruction that administered schools in every pueblo, and the
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initial purchase and redistribution of lands from religious orders that had previously impeded
private land claims.160
Whereas MacArthur was inclined to a hard imposition of order, Taft hoped to earn the
trust of and empower the Filipinos. He elaborated on his brand of soft diplomacy in a February
25, 1902 hearing before the House Committee on Insular Affairs. “We were always requested to,
and always did, attend banquets in the evening and subsequently a baile or dance...The
Commission regarded these entertainments, however, as considerably more than a mere social
importance. We were anxious to inspire confidence and to show the people that we had
confidence in their good intentions.”161 Where MacArthur hammered order into dissident
Filipinos, Taft used liberty as an incentive to inspire republican potential. With Filipinos
participating in autonomous municipal governments and serving in provincial offices, “the dual
form of government has put the civil government more or less in contrast with the military army,
and has produced that feeling of welcome toward the civil arm.”162 Between MacArthur and
Taft, the first two acts of Root’s three-part play in self-government – stability on the ground and
republican government actuated on a local basis – played out simultaneously in the Philippines
through the fall of 1901.
Although they were tasked with managing different extremes of Root’s American idea,
like MacArthur, Taft grasped its deeper implications for a new American foreign policy. The
issue at hand did not concern the ultimate constitutional relation between the U.S. and the
Philippines. Taft bristled at the anti-imperialists’ extended questioning on this point. “With
reference to the question whether the territorial form of government...shall be a preparation for
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statehood, or a preparation for independence ultimately, or a preparation for a quasi
independence...I do not think it is now the time to make a definite declaration...it will take a
generation, probably longer, to found a stable and strictly popular government in those
islands.”163 America’s priority was to see ordered liberty manifested in Filipino self-government,
under the continued oversight of an American benefactor. “The guidance and control of the
American element in that government must continue...until practice and example under the
government now to be formed shall develop in those people a knowledge of what selfgovernment is, and a self-restraint, without which self-government is impossible.”164 Immediate
independence, which the anti-imperialists of the Democratic Party advocated, would only
“consign the 90 percent of uneducated people largely to the same condition that they occupied
under Spanish rule.”165
For Taft, turning the Philippines loose could result in military dictatorship, anarchy, or
colonial subjection to an illiberal power like Spain. Only American sponsorship of selfgovernment and patience on the constitutional question could make for a credible international
mission. It was remarkable that Elihu Root had commissioned men of starkly opposing outlooks,
yet played to their complementary strengths, in advancing the common cause of ordered liberty.

While Taft and MacArthur administered ordered liberty, Root looked to ensure
America’s lasting right to preserve order in the Philippines. The vehicle for this was the March 2,
1901 “Spooner Amendment.” The amendment, which Root had initially drafted, provided that,
“All military, civil and judicial powers necessary to govern the Philippine Islands...shall be
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exercised in such manner as the President of the United States shall direct for the establishment
of civil government and for maintaining and protecting the inhabitants of said islands.”166
Roosevelt now held an extended lease to moderate affairs above the griping Congressional antiimperialists.
Theodore Roosevelt had himself become a subscriber to Root’s American idea. The
president’s annual message of December 3, 1901 revealed his commitment to Filipino selfgovernment. “Our earnest effort is to help these people upward along the stony and difficult path
that leads to self-government. We hope to make our administration of the islands honorable to
our Nation by making it of the highest benefit to the Filipinos themselves.”167 Although
America’s sustained commitment on the islands would require time and patience, with
occasionally profound military blunders, the long view looked far brighter than the disordered
alternatives. “What has taken us thirty generations to achieve, we cannot expect to see another
race accomplish out of hands...In dealing with the Philippine people we must show both patience
and strength, forbearance and steadfast resolution.”168 Roosevelt distinguished U.S. sponsorship
of self-government from Old World imperialism. “Our aim is high. We do not desire to do for
the islanders merely what has elsewhere been done for tropic peoples by even the best foreign
governments. We hope to do for them what has never been done for any people of the tropics –
to make them fit for self-government after the fashion of the really free nations.”169
Yes, the United States had annexed the Philippines per the terms of the Treaty of Paris.
True, liberal tariff rates and Far Eastern markets invigorated a faltering American economy. And
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indeed, the constitutional relation of the archipelago to the United States remained ambiguous.
All of these considerations were peripheral to a more central point. By the time a formal
constitution was drafted and approved for the Philippines in June 1902, the United States had
created self-government, consummated with the complete termination of military rule on the
archipelago.
The project remained far from complete, and the toll of guerilla warfare was
unquestionable. Yet it would be disingenuous to understate the transformation that civic life had
undergone in just three years of American direction. The 1902 constitution outlined individual
liberties premised on the American Bill of Rights. It created a popular legislature, the Philippine
assembly, to work in conjunction with the American-directed Philippine Commission. It halted
the landlord-tenant system that had traditionally tied laborers to friars’ lands.170 It was no wonder
that Democratic anti-imperialists then proclaiming the Philippines a black scar on the American
Constitution so flustered Root. Root condemned them in a September 24, 1902 address in Peoria,
Illinois.
The Democrats declared that we had no right to succeed because our assertion of
sovereignty was a violation of the Declaration of Independence, which declares that
governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed...(That maxim’s)
unqualified application without regard to the rule and progress of humanity and ordered
liberty among men, is contrary to the whole course of American history.171
Ordered liberty took precedence before autonomous independence. What had occurred in the
Philippines was a natural outgrowth of America’s domestic governmental tradition.
Elihu Root’s experiment in ordered liberty was succeeding and would persist beyond his
term. “Filipinization” further diminished America’s commitment and put the Filipinos in charge
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of their own affairs for three decades of U.S. oversight. In 1935, true to the promises of Root,
Taft, MacArthur, and Roosevelt, the United States granted the Philippines internal autonomy
under a commonwealth government, with independence to follow ten years later.172

Conclusion
In his cornerstone history First Great Triumph, Warren Zimmerman contends that
America’s imperial moment during and in the immediate wake of the Spanish-American War
made possible an American century. He identifies his book as “a book about imperialism,”173 and
concludes by noting, “The imperial initiation at the end of the nineteenth-century had prepared
Americans for the great power role that, in the twentieth-century, only they could play.”174
Zimmerman’s text, despite its balanced appraisal of what he sees as a mix of “darkness and
light” in America’s conduct on Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, perhaps best represents
the pitfalls of the present landscape of Spanish-American War historiography. His work is
premised on “five Americans who made their country a great power.” What results is a blender
history that obfuscates Elihu Root, an actor who has received astonishingly little recognition for
his exceptional role in shaping a new American diplomacy.
Elihu Root did not believe that an imperial moment was necessary to make the U.S. a
great power. Since independence, the distinct idea of American government – the idea of ordered
liberty – had reaped providential successes for the United States. That idea in practice took the
form of a sliding scale between local autonomy and collective order. With the stable conduct of
local self-government, there was no need for Washington’s central order to do anything more
than administer government at its natural course. Yet at critical existential moments, the
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American constitution provided for a just intervention from the center: collecting a national debt,
affirming the Louisiana Purchase, and crushing Confederate rebels represented but a few such
moments. Root figured that American foreign policy at the turn of the twentieth-century should
be characterized not by imperial expansionism, but by international Americanism: sponsoring
self-governing nations with a flexible use of American order to achieve a lasting liberty for these
peoples, while ensuring America’s right to intervene in sister republics when tremors shook the
family of nations.
Not all of the projects were success stories in the long term. Ironically, Cuba, the only
island to truly unite America behind the cause of humanitarian intervention, would fall decades
later under the most oppressive regime of any of the islands that Root administered. There are
forces in international politics that can undermine even the most virtuous of diplomatic models;
Root would have readily conceded that his idea was not infallible.
Having completed the narrative of Root’s attempts to foster self-government in the
Spanish islands, two conclusions seem salient. First, at its inception, self-government in Cuba,
Puerto Rico, and the Philippines was not the product of an “imperial America.” Imperialism is
characterized by a master nation’s suppression of a people willing and capable of selfgovernment. Root’s policy at times verged on an excessively punitive order, as it did in the
Philippines. Yet Root and his colleagues always maintained an overriding desire to slacken the
reins of American order once the local situation stabilized. Root’s tariff policies were more
geared to shoring up insular economic stability than padding the coffers of an economic empire.
America’s armies functioned more as humanitarian task forces than militant soldiers. Although
American generals countered guerilla warfare in the Philippines with excessive force, this was
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not an imperial tactic. It was instead the unfortunate byproduct of an altruistic desire to crush an
illiberal force like Aguinaldo, just as Lincoln had done the American Confederacy.
Second, Elihu Root’s new American diplomacy premised on ordered liberty would carry
resonances through the duration of the twentieth-century. In February 1904, as he prepared to
step down from the War Department, Root argued that his work on the islands should serve as a
lasting precedent for American foreign relations. In his February 3 “Tribute to Theodore
Roosevelt,” Root reflected, “The problems that seemed to hang over us at the close of the war
with Spain have gone far towards solution. We, of America, have discovered that we, too,
possess the supreme governing capacity, capacity not merely to govern ourselves at home, but
that great power that in all ages has made the difference between the great and the small nations,
the capacity to govern men wherever they were found.”175 With provisions like the Platt and
Spooner Amendments, and later decrees like Roosevelt’s corollary, the U.S. had secured its
place at the center of world order. On a nation-by-nation basis, the American army had become
“teachers of the art of self-government; and in Porto Rico and Cuba and the Philippines they
have proved themselves by the score...to be simply American citizens.”176
The impassioned Root desired ordered liberty to become the cornerstone of a twentiethcentury international Americanism. The Spanish-American War had defined America’s mission
abroad as, singularly, “the great onward march of American institutions.”177 In a February 22
address in Chicago on “The Preservation of American Ideals,” Root outlined the implications of
America’s new international presence. “Going through our period of isolation, passing beyond
the time of selfishness where we were making our government for ourselves and thinking only of
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our own interests, there is opening before us the vista of missionary life.”178 He commenced a
rhetorical crescendo:
If we believe what we say; if we believe that the free institutions under which we live are
adapted to lift up the masses of mankind out of the hard and degraded conditions under
which they have lived in all human history; if we believe that the liberty and justice that
prevail under this flag of ours are competent to bless mankind and bring in a day of
loftier and happier life for all the world, there opens before us now the opportunity to
testify to our belief.179
Can it be denied that Root’s tenure at the War Department made for a lasting influence on
American diplomacy? The idea of ordered liberty has served as the most salient force behind
more than a century of American international relations: from American intervention in the First
World War, through U.S. attempts to build self-government in Japan and Germany following the
Second World War, and in the past decade, to America’s sponsorship of ordered liberty on the
ground in Iraq and Afghanistan.
By the conclusion of Root’s tour as Secretary of War, what had been an ambiguous
understanding of America’s role abroad was now clarified. America’s military mission was no
longer relegated to a mere defense of borders, but now included the international sponsorship of
ordered self-government, with the soul of America’s constitution tied to the nations it had
sponsored. Speaking once more in Canton, Ohio in January 1903, Elihu Root affirmed the new
role that America’s military would serve in the world:
They embody and act upon the traditions of the farewell address, the traditions of Grant’s
dying message to his countrymen, ‘Let us have peace.’ They are an engine not of war for
war’s sake, but of peace, and war for the sake of peace...They are missionaries of ordered
liberty, and wherever they go ordered liberty follows. ‘By their fruits, ye shall know
them.’180
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When placed among the wide expanse of Spanish-American War histories, this essay’s
point of departure may be considered unique. I began this project intending to discern a moment
between the conclusion of the American Civil War and America’s decision to intervene in the
First World War, when American diplomacy first witnessed the emergence of a foreign policy in
some way premised on national self-determination. Erez Manela’s The Wilsonian Moment: SelfDetermination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism (2007) provided the
necessary impetus for this investigation. Manela argues that through the course of a six-month
window from the fall of 1918 to the spring of 1919, Woodrow Wilson’s “Fourteen Points”
appeal for self-determination became a worldwide phenomenon. Surely, I reasoned, this
“Wilsonian moment” had not sprung from nowhere; perhaps there existed an earlier precedent
for self-determination in American foreign policy, possibly tied to Confederate romanticism
(Wilson was himself a proud son of Dixie).
In setting about this research question, I consulted several survey histories of modern
American diplomacy that begin with the Civil War’s resolution at Appomattox. Among the most
illuminating were Robert H. Wiebe’s The Search for Order, 1877-1920 (1967), Charles S.
Campbell’s The Transformation of American Foreign Relations, 1865-1900 (1976), and Jackson
Lears’s Rebirth of a Nation: The Making of Modern America, 1877-1920 (2009). It became
increasingly clear with each perusal that the Spanish-American War might provide the context
for such a “pre-Wilsonian moment.” Cuba seemed an especially salient influence for an
American foreign policy premised in some way on anti-colonial self-determination. For the first
time in its history, a definitive American great power had commissioned a war for another
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nation’s independence against the tyranny of imperial misrule. At face value, this sounded quite
similar to the appeal that Wilson had made in 1918.
However, American diplomacy was not so well defined during and in the immediate
wake of the Spanish-American War. True, the United States had entered the conflict on
humanitarian grounds and succeeded in liberating Cuba from imperial Spain. Yet there was a key
difference between 1918 and 1898: in 1918, President Wilson appealed to national selfdetermination as an attempt to derive some sort of meaning from the otherwise meaningless
devastation wrought in the First World War; in 1898, appeals for Cuban independence were
spurred on by an excited spectrum of motives and agendas, with no agenda emerging the clear
victor in driving a new American diplomacy abroad.
I still persisted with my original hunch that the nest egg of modern American selfdetermationist sentiment lay in the Spanish-American War. The anti-imperialists captivated my
attention. Upon completing E. Berkeley Tompkins’s excellent survey history, Anti-Imperialism
in the United States: The Great Debate, 1890-1920 (1970), which contains a whole chapter
devoted to “Cuba Libre,” and Robert L. Beisner’s exploration of the lead cast of characters
behind the movement, Twelve Against Empire: The Anti-Imperialists, 1898-1900 (1968), I raced
to Yale’s Sterling Memorial Library to grab the published letters of Mark Twain, the speeches of
William Graham Sumner, and the texts of Stanford President David Jordan Starr. Perhaps, I
thought, these dissidents may have lost the short-term fight against American empire, yet won
the long-term struggle for the soul of American foreign policy with the Wilsonian moment in
1918. I even sketched a rough research itinerary that would have had me visiting several of the
same archives that Beisner had explored.
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Yet, after a short time, my anti-imperialist kick began to seem disingenuous to my lofty
research question. Although Woodrow Wilson referenced the Spanish-American War in his
History of the American People (1901), he never once invoked the anti-imperialists. Wilson’s
contemporary writings painted the Spanish-American War as a watershed in American foreign
policy, but not on the basis of self-determination. He spoke more in general terms about the rise
of a new American great power seated for the first time at the center of world order – more like
President Theodore Roosevelt than anti-imperialists like Sumner. My attempt to decipher some
sort of link between the Spanish-American War and Wilsonian self-determination thus reached
an impasse. However, in its place emerged new and invigorating research questions. If not selfdetermination, what did the Spanish-American War mean? Was it simply victory that made
America a preeminent force on the international stage, or was there perhaps a deeper theoretical
significance to the conflict as it concerned American diplomacy? Had the U.S. experimented
with imperialism in a way comparable to the powers of the Old World, or was there something
distinct to America’s colonization of the Spanish islands?
My exploration of the relevant historiography revealed an overwhelmingly consistent
opinion: that America’s “imperial moment” during and after the conflict had made the U.S. a
force to be reckoned with on the international stage. This argument is crafted by histories that
approach the conflict through many diverse lenses. H. Wayne Morgan’s America’s Road to
Empire: The War with Spain and Overseas Expansion (1965) is a standard bearer among the
histories that rattle off the pivotal moments of the military narrative that led from Cuban
pacification, to Philippine annexation, and ultimately, to America’s “imperial possession” of
several overseas colonies. Such histories, including Morgan’s own, often confine U.S.
sponsorship of self-government on the islands to an “Epilogue” following what they deem to be

Crawford 69
the eminently more significant events of 1898. Other histories I would cast into this first category
are Frank Freidel’s illustrative The Splendid Little War (1958) Brian P. Damiani’s Advocates of
Empire: William McKinley, the Senate and American Expansionism, 1898-1899 (1987) and John
A. Corry’s 1898: Prelude to a Century (1998).
A second group of histories discusses America’s “imperial moment” as a constructivist
byproduct of contemporaneous American economic considerations and intellectual currents on
the U.S. homefront. Both Walter LaFeber’s The New Empire: An Interpretation of American
Expansion, 1860-1898 (1963) and William Appleman Williams’s The Tragedy of American
Diplomacy, 1750-1955 (1959) highlight American economic and business interests as the
inspiration for U.S. century-end advances into the Caribbean. Richard Hofstadter’s essay
“Manifest Destiny and the Philippines” (1971) shifts the focus from economic interests abroad to
economic challenges at home. He discusses what he terms “the psychic crisis of the 1890s” that
resulted from economic depression in 1893 and the free silver Populist agitation of 1896. Taken
in concert with his noteworthy Social Darwinism in American Thought (1949), Hofstadter
contends that American unsettlement in the 1890s made for an Anglo-Saxon jingoism that
sought to extend American Manifest Destiny beyond the limits posed by coastal borders.
Contrasting these histories of the Spanish-American War that emphasize economics are
those that confer more significance to nationalism and ideology. Julius W. Pratt’s Expansionists
of 1898: The Acquisition of Hawaii and the Spanish Islands (1936) serves as the standard bearer
of this historical line. Pratt’s examination of financial journals and newspapers leads him to
conclude that businessmen were negative to war and did everything to prevent it. The war in
1898, according to Pratt, was instead driven by idealistic and humanitarian arguments. We see
Pratt’s influence in histories that view the Spanish-American War as the genesis of an American
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mission abroad. Robert Kagan’s Dangerous Nation (2006) views American intervention in Cuba
as a lasting humanitarian precedent for American great power diplomacy. Tony Smith’s
America’s Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the
Twentieth-Century (1994) describes the Philippines as America’s first of many attempts at
democratic nation building in a foreign land. Paul T. McCartney’s Power and Progress:
American National Identity, the War of 1898, and the Rise of American Imperialism (2006)
discusses at length the parallels between American conduct in the Spanish-American War and
the interventionist foreign policy of George W. Bush.
I was struck by how histories of such differing contentions and vantage points all
accepted the idea of an “American imperialism” with hardly any debate. I thus determined to
engage studies that deal more in theoretical considerations of American imperialism. Among the
many noted in my bibliography, the text that most impacted my research was Göran Rystad’s
Ambiguous Imperialism: American Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics at the Turn of the
Century. (1975) Rystad concludes that it is impossible to identify a single motivating force
behind American territorial expansion from Manifest Destiny through American colonization
after the Spanish-American War. He runs through a timeline of political theories pertaining to
specific periods of American expansion: from early American “continentalism,” to ideological
“informalism,” to the “hemispherism” that followed the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, to “globalism,”
or a conscious imperialism. Rystad’s text was, for me, the most salient demonstration of the
excessive tendency of American diplomatic historians to reduce U.S. foreign policy to rigid,
sectioned off periods. Such a tendency has made for an unquestioned branding of the SpanishAmerican War as the primordial moment when an American great power tried her hand at
imperialism for the first time. America’s humanitarian conduct in Cuba, and McKinley’s
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retrospective consternation over the U.S. taking of the Philippines, seemed to indicate that the
imperial question was not so simple.
In setting about a new research plan, I first determined to shift focus from 1898 to the fall
of 1899. Spanish-American War historiography emphasizes 1898 to a fault. Reading through
several of Secretary Russell A. Alger’s reports, along with the addresses of William McKinley,
revealed no concrete foreign policy, be it imperialism or otherwise. The U.S. had mostly flown
by the seat of its pants, going along with what seemed the most pragmatic course available at the
time and establishing vastly discrepant policies for each island suddenly taken on as a colony.
This did not seem to me like the appropriate nexus for a thoughtful history of how the conflict
may have shaped the future course of American diplomacy.
The turning point in my research came with my obtaining Robert Bacon and James
Brown Scott’s collected War Department reports of Secretary Elihu Root, The Military and
Colonial Policy of the United States (1916). I instantly knew that Root was the key to a more
nuanced, theoretical treatment of the greater diplomatic resonances that carried from the
Spanish-American War. Needed was not a reassessment of the war itself, but instead, American
sponsorship of self-government on Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines in the war’s aftermath.
What started out with one volume of war reports quickly snowballed into a much bigger project.
I obtained Bacon and Scott’s three supplemental volumes of Elihu Root’s collected speeches and
addresses. I discerned Root’s vision for the islands – the first such vision to emerge amidst the
wider tumult of the Spanish-American War – and saw how it carried down the hierarchy of the
War Department to his generals and diplomats, most especially Leonard Wood in Cuba, George
W. Davis in Puerto Rico, and William Howard Taft in the Philippines. American sponsorship of
self-government would paint a tabula rasa over the quasi-imperial colonization that the U.S. had
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undertaken before ratifying the April 11, 1899 Treaty of Paris. Root intended to quell this
imperial notion once and for all and substitute in its place a trial American diplomacy premised
on the distinctly American idea of ordered liberty.

